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Aboriginal Title 
as a Constitutionally 
Protected Property Right 
KENT MCNEIL 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia' is undoubtedly one of the most impor-
tant decisions the Supreme Court of Canada has ever handed down. It 
will have a continuing, long-term impact on the Aboriginal peoples' re-
lationships with the federal and provincial governments, as well as on 
the constitutional division of powers in this country.2 While there are 
many aspects of the decision that require analysis and discussion, this 
paper's focus is on the definition of Aboriginal title provided by the 
Court. In particular, I am going to discuss the status of Aboriginal title, 
~~<::~~  a pr?Ee~ty_ rig~~1J2.u~- ~1E.?.~~:__ a_ ~!E.£~~!!!.i9n_ally}.rof£.~t~I£I£Eitj 
right. This wi1f'involve looking at the central position of property, espe-
Cially real property, in the common law. 3 It will also involve examining 
the effect of constitutionalizing Aboriginal title, along with other Ab-
original rights, in 1982. Related to this is the question of how Aborig-
in~l .tJt!~ .. J~4D __ be infringed. Finally, I will return to property rights 
~ generally, and bfieflyconsider the implications of Delgamuukw for the 
protection accorded to those rights by Anglo-Canadian law. 
Notes will be found on pages 67-75. 
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1. The Central Position of Real Property 
in the Common Law 
Land was by far the most important form of wealth in England prior to 
the Industrial Revolution. Due to the feudal system, it also played a 
central role in the political, military and social structure of the country. 
So as the common law took form in the period following the Norman 
Conquest, disputes over land naturally predominated in the king's 
courts. Judicial decisions involving land accordingly played a major role 
in the development, not only of property law, but of other branches of 
English law as well.4 
Because land was so important, protecting real property from arbi-
trary seizure by the king was at least as important as guarding it against 
other persons. The nobles who forced King John to sign Magna Carta in 
1215 thought this protection to be of sufficient importance to warrant 
a key clause to curtail this abuse of royal power. Chapter 29 accordingly 
provided that "[n]o Freeman shall ... be disseised [i.e., dispossessed of 
his land] .... but by the lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the law of 
the Land."5 This restraint on the authority of the executive branch of 
government is still in force in Britain, 6 and would have been received in 
Canada as part of our constitutional law. 7 It is a basic aspect of the rule 
of law, 6 protecting real property against government taking except in 
accordance with law.9 
However, the constitutional protection accorded to property rights 
by Anglo-Canadian law is only effective against the executive. Due to the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty (or supremacy), 10 the legislative 
branch of government has no binding constitutional obligation to re-
spect private property. But this does not mean that property is not a 
fundamental right in our legal system. On the contrary, it has been long 
been regarded as enjoying special status in English law, along with oth-
er fundamental rights and freedoms. William Blackstone, for example, 
the great compiler and categorizer of English law, said this in reference 
to the rights and liberties of British subjects: 
these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles; the 
right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right 
of private property; because, as there is no other known method of 
compulsion, or of abridging man's natural free will, but by an in-
fringement or diminution of one or other of these important 
rights, the preservation of these, inviolate, may justly be said to in-
clude the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and 
most extensive sense. 11 
Modern enumeration of fundamental rights and freedoms also include 
the right of private property. Halsbury's Laws of England, 12 for example, 
f. 
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lists the right to property under the constitutional law heading, "Duties 
and Rights of the Subject," along with liberty, the right to life, freedom 
of expression, freedom of conscience, and the right of association. 
While lack of protection against legislative taking means that prop-
erty rights do not enjoy the kind of constitutional status they have been 
accorded in the United States, 13 presumptions of statutory interpretation 
do provide limited protection against legislative infringement in Anglo-
Canadian law. 14 There are two relevant presumptions. First, it is always 
presumed that the legislature does not intend to interfere with vested 
rights, particularly rights of property. 15 So if the legislature intends to 
take private property, it must express that intention clearly, as the courts 
will, if possible, construe the legislation as not interfering with property 
rights. 16 Secondly, the courts will presume that the legislature intends 
that compensation be paid for any private property that is taken, unless 
compensation is unequivocally denied. 17 Through this indirect means of 
interpretation of statutes, the courts have succeeded in providing prop-
erty rights with limited protection against legislative taking. 18 
When Canada's Constitution was patriated in 1982, a conscious 
decision was made not to include property rights in the fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. 19 However, Aboriginal 
rights were accorded constitutional protection outside the Charter by 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.20 As Aboriginal title is an Ab-
original right, it is constitutionally protected.21 Moreover, the Delgamu-
ukw decision confirmed suggestions in earlier Supreme Court decisions 
that Aboriginal title is a form of property right.22 We therefore need to 
examine the Delgamuukw decision in more detail to understand the pro-
prietary nature of Aboriginal title. 
2. Aboriginal Title as a Property Right 
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer23 rejected the argument 
made by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en that Aboriginal title is tanta-
mount to an inalienable fee simple estate. 24 But he also rejected the po-
sition of the Canadian and British Columbian governments that 
Aboriginal title has no independent content, being no more than a bun-
dle of rights to engage in activities that are themselves Aboriginal 
rights, or, alternatively, that "aboriginal title, at most, encompasses the 
right to exclusive use and occupation ofland in order to engage in those 
activities which are aboriginal rights themselves." 25 Instead, Lamer 
found that Aboriginal title lies in between these opposing positions. He 
described its content in this way: 
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the 
right to engage in specific activities which may be themselves ab-
original rights. Rather, it confers the right to use land for a variety 
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of activities, not all of which need be aspects of practices, customs 
and traditions which are integral to the distinctive cultures of ab-
original societies. Those activities do not constitute the right per se; 
rather, they are parasitic on the underlying title. However, that 
range of uses is subject to the limitation that they must not be ir-
reconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land which 
forms the basis of the particular group's aboriginal title. This in-
herent limit, to be explained more fully below, flows from the def-
inition of aboriginal title as a sui generis interest in land, and is one 
way in which aboriginal title is distinct from a fee simple.26 
The Chief Justice went on to elaborate on this description of Aboriginal 
title. Commenting on St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen,27 
he said subsequent cases have demonstrated that the Privy Council's 
description of it as "a personal and usufructuary right" "is not particu-
larly helpful to explain the various dimensions of aboriginal title." 28 He 
continued: 
What the Privy Council sought to capture is that aboriginal title is 
a sui generis interest in land. Aboriginal title has been described as 
sui generis in order to distinguish it from "normal" proprietary in-
terests, such as fee simple. However, as I will now develop, it is 
also sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be com-
pletely explained by reference either to the common law rules of 
real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal 
systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be understood by 
reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives.29 
So Aboriginal title, while unlike other common law real property 
interests, is nonetheless "an interest in land."30 Moreover, it is "a right 
to the land itself,"31 which "encompasses the right to exclusive use and oc-
cupation of land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, 
which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and 
traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures. "32 These 
descriptions of Aboriginal title clearly indicate that it is a real property 
right, though sui generis in nature. 33 This is confirmed by an observation 
the Chief Justice made respecting the general inalienability of Aborigi-
nal title, other than by surrender to the Crown: 
This Court has taken pains to clarify that aboriginal title is only 
"personal" in this sense [i.e., in the sense of being inalienable], 
and does not mean that aboriginal title is a non-proprietary inter-
est which amounts to no more than a licence to use and occupy the 
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land and cannot compete on an equal footing with other propri-
etary interests: see Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988) 2 S.C.R. 654, 
at p. 677.34 
Nor do the other sid generis aspects of Aboriginal title referred to by the 
Chief Justice diminish its status as a proprietary interest. The first of these is its 
source in occupation of land "before the assertion of British sovereignty, 
whereas no1mal estates, like fee simple, arise afterward."35 There is a similar-
ity here with the land titles of the French settlers who came to Canada 
during the French regime-their property interests, which continued 
after France ceded New France to Britain in 1763,36 are not "normal es-
tates, like fee simple," because their source is not English law, but the 
French law that was in force prior to Britain's acquisition of sovereign-
ty. However, in contrast with the situation of the French settlers, the 
relevance of Aboriginal law to Aboriginal title appears to be its value, 
along with proof of physical presence and use, in establishing occupa-
tion of land at the time of assertion of Crown sovereignty. 37 Once that 
occupation has been shown, apparently Aboriginal title then exists as 
a generic right that does not vary from one Aboriginal nation to another 
in accordance with their diverse systems of law. 38 However, Aboriginal 
law would probably be applicable within each Aboriginal nation to gov-
ern the land rights of the members inter se.39 
Another sui generis aspect of Aboriginal title that distinguishes it 
from common law real property interests is that it is communal. Chief 
Justice Lamer put it this way in Delgamuukw: 
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it 
is a collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal na-
tion. Decisions with respect to that land are also made by that 
community.40 
This is an extremely important passage in his judgment, as it pro-
vides a foundation for a right of self-government.41 For the purposes of 
this paper, however, it also reveals how the law of Aboriginal title ap-
pears to diverge from the usual common law position on legal person-
ality. As a general rule, in Anglo-Canadian law title to property must be 
vested in an individual person or persons, who can be either natural per-
sons (human beings) or artificial persons (corporations). If a group of 
people owns property, title must be vested in all the members of the 
group as individuals. The group cannot, as an entity in its own right, hold 
title because it lacks legal personality. It is for this reason that the com-
mon law does not permit unincorporated associations as such to hold 
title to property.42 By holding that Aboriginal title is "a collective right 
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to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation," Chief Justice Lam-
er cannot have meant that the members hold as individuals, as there 
would then be no significant distinction between this aspect of Aborig-
inal title and landholding by members of unincorporated associations, 
and so Aboriginal title would not be sui generis in this respect. Instead, 
he must have intended to accord a form of legal personality to Aborigi-
nal nations. 43 If so, they have unique status in Anglo-Canadian law 
which probably enhances their claim to a right of self-government, 44 but 
does not affect the proprietary nature of their Aboriginal title. 
A final sui generis aspect of Aboriginal title is the "inherent limit" 
mentioned in one of the passages already quoted from Delgamuukw, 
where Lamer said that Aboriginal lands cannot be used in ways that 
are "irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land which 
forms the basis of the particular group's aboriginal title. "45 He referred 
to this as a "limit on the content of aboriginal title," and said that it is 
"a manifestation of the principle that underlies the various dimen-
sions of that special interest in land-it is a sui generis interest that is 
distinct from 'normal' proprietary interests, most notably fee 
simple." 46 He then linked this inherent limit to the need to maintain 
the continuity of an Aboriginal nation's special relationship with their 
land: "That relationship should not be prevented from continuing into 
the future. As a result, uses of the land that would threaten that future 
relationship are, by their very nature, excluded from the content of ab-
original title." 47 
This inherent limit raises important issues that cannot be dealt 
with here, such as the potential impact of the pre-sovereignty practices, 
customs and traditions of particular Aboriginal nations on the uses 
they can make of their lands, and the implications of the limit for self-
government. 48 But for the purposes of this paper, what needs to be un-
derstood is that the inherent limit does not diminish the proprietary 
nature of Aboriginal title. By way of analogy, consider zoning laws in 
Canadian cities. Those laws often place quite severe restrictions on the 
uses that fee simple owners can make of their lands, without affecting 
the proprietary nature of their title. Similarly, the inherent limit does 
not affect the characterization of Aboriginal title as proprietary. While 
the limit may restrict the uses which Aboriginal nations can make of 
their lands, their right of use and occupation is nonetheless exclusive, 49 
and it is this right to exclude others, rather than a right to put the land 
to any use, that makes Aboriginal title proprietary. 50 But one effect of 
the limit is probably that there are uses to which some Aboriginal lands 
cannot be put by anyone as long as they are subject to Aboriginal title, 51 
in the same way as there are uses to which zoned lands cannot be put 
as long as the zoning restrictions remain in force. 
i: 
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It is therefore clear from the Delgamuukw decision that Aboriginal 
title is a proprietary interest in land, though differing from what the 
Chief Justice called "normal" common law property interests, like the 
fee simple. Moreover, it includes a right to exclusive use and occupa-
tion. The proprietary nature and exclusivity of Aboriginal title are not 
affected by its sui generis aspects, which include its source in occupation 
of land prior to Crown sovereignty, its inalienability other than by sur-
render to the Crown, its communal nature, and restrictions on use aris-
ing from its inherent limit. But as mentioned earlier, Aboriginal title is 
not just a property right. Since the entrenchment of Aboriginal and 
treaty rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it is also a con-
stitutionally protected property right. We now need to consider what this 
means, and the extent to which Aboriginal title can be infringed, not-
withstanding its constitutional status. 
3. Constitutional Protection and 
Infringement of Aboriginal Title 
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,52 provides: "The existing ab-
original and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby 
recognized and affirmed." In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer said this 
about this provision: 
s.35 (1) did not create aboriginal rights; rather, it accorded consti-
tutional status to those rights which were "existing" in 1982. The 
provision, at the very least, constitutionalized those rights which 
aboriginal peoples possessed at common law, since those rights ex-
isted at the time s.35(1) came into force. Since aboriginal title was 
a common law right whose existence was recognized well before 
1982 (e.g., Calder [v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] 
S.C.R. 313]), s.35(1) has constitutionalized it in its full form. 53 
The reason Aboriginal rights were accorded constitutional protection 
in 1982 was to protect them against interference by the legislative branch 
of governments.54 This protection was not required against private per-
sons and the executive branch because, to the extent that these rights are 
recognized as such by the common law, that law protects them, along 
with other legal rights, against interference by anyone, unless the inter-
ference is authorized by legislation. 55 But as we have seen, constitution-
al entrenchment was required if these rights were to be protected 
against legislative interference because, due to the doctrine of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, even fundamental rights and freedoms are subject 
to legislative infringement if the intention to infringe them is unequiv-
ocally expressed. 56 
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Of course constitutional entrenchment does not provide absolute 
protection against legislative infringement. Where Charter rights are · 
concerned, section 33 (the "notwithstanding" clause) provides for leg-
islative override, and section 1 subjects those rights "to such reason-
able limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society." While pointing out that these provisions do 
not apply to section 35 because it is outside the Charter,57 the Supreme 
Court in R. v. Sparrow58 created a test for infringement of Aboriginal 
rights that is similar in some respects to the approach it uses in apply-
ing section 1. Briefly stated, the Sparrow test requires the Crown to 
prove that any legislative (or legislatively authorized) infringement of 
Aboriginal rights is for a valid legislative objective that is compelling 
and substantial, and that the Crown's fiduciary obligations towards the 
Aboriginal peoples have been respected. If the Crown fails to do this, 
the infringement will be constitutionally invalid.59 
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer made it clear that the Sparrow 
justification test applies to infringements of Aboriginal title. 60 On 
why the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples can be in-
fringed at all, he said it was "important to repeat" what he had said 
in R. v. Gladstone: 
Because ... distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are part 
of, a broader social, political and economic community, over which 
the Crown is sovereign, there are circumstances in which, in order 
to pursue objectives of compelling and substantial importance to 
that community as a whole (taking into account the fact that ab-
original societies are part of that community), some limitation of 
those rights will be justifiable. Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of 
the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the broader political commu-
nity of which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, where the ob-
jectives furthered by those limits are of sufficient importance to the broader 
community as a whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation. 61 
Elaborating on the kinds of objectives that might justify infringement 
of Aboriginal title, the ChiefJustice said this: 
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, 
and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the 
interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or en-
dangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement 
of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of ob-
jectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can 
justify the infringement of aboriginal title. Whether a particular 
r 
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measure or government act can be explained by reference to one of 
those objectives, however, is ultimately a question of fact that will 
have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.62 
As most of these objectives- agriculture, forestry, and mining, for ex-
ample-relate to provincial areas of jurisdiction, the issue of provincial 
power to infringe Aboriginal title arises here. But while Lamer specifi-
cally said in Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title can be infringed by the 
provinces, 63 he also held that Aboriginal title is under exclusive federal 
authority because it is within the core of federal jurisdiction over "In-
dians, and Lands reserved for the Indians. "6" As explained in detail else-
where, in my opinion these two aspects of Lamer's judgment are 
irreconcilable, and so the issue of provincial power to infringe Aborig-
inal title will have to be re-examined by the Court. 65 
For the purposes of this paper, then, we will focus our attention on 
federal power to infringe Aboriginal title, which apparently arises from 
Parliament's authority over "Lands reserved for the Indians."66 The first 
thing to note is that the power of Parliament to extinguish Aboriginal ti-
tle, which undoubtedly existed prior to 1982, 67 was taken away by sec-
tion 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In R. v. Van der Peet, Chief Justice 
Lamer said this in reference to Aboriginal rights generally, of which Ab-
original title is one manifestation: 
At common law aboriginal rights did not, of course, have constitu-
tional status, with the result that Parliament could, at any time, ex-
tinguish or regulate those rights ... ; it is this which distinguishes 
the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed in s.35(1) from the 
aboriginal rights protected by the common law. Subsequent to 
s.35 (1) aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished and can only be reg-
ulated or infringed consistent with the justificatory test laid out by 
this Court in Sparrow, supra [n.33).68 
As we have seen, the range of objectives that will meet the first branch 
of the justificatory test for infringement of Aboriginal title was stated by 
Lamer in Delgamuukw to be "fairly broad," including "the development 
of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power ... [and] the 
building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to 
support those aims.''69 What Lamer had in mind here does not appear 
to be limited to the taking of Aboriginal lands for public purposes, such 
as the construction of highways or state-owned hydroelectric projects. 
Instead, he seems to have also envisaged that Parliament could tempo-
rarily take Aboriginal lands and make them available to private individ-
uals _and corporations (his "foreign populations"), who would then 
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engage in farming, forestry, mining, etc. 10 And as long as this was "of 
sufficient importance to the broader community as a whole"71 (i.e., the 
Canadian public), the taking would be justifiable under the Sparrow test. 
This means that the real property rights of the Aboriginal peoples 
are not just subject to legislative regulation in the public interest, 72 as are 
all property rights, for purposes such as environmental protection. Ab-
original title is also subject to legislative taking, 73 not only for direct 
public purposes such as the construction of highways and other infra-
structure, but also for private development that has only a tangential 
connection with the public interest. 74 For example, if Aboriginal lands 
are suitable for agriculture, but are not.being used by their Aboriginal 
titleholders for that purpose, it seems that Parliament can take them 
and allow farmers to use them if that would be of sufficient importance 
to Canadians as a whole. As I have stated elsewhere, this sounds very 
much like a modern-day equivalent of "a familiar justification for dis-
possessing Aboriginal peoples in the heyday of European colonialism 
in eastern North America-agriculturalists are superior to hunters and 
gatherers, and so can take their lands"75 
What is even more remarkable about this judicial disregard for the 
sanctity of Aboriginal title76 is that, unlike other property rights, it is 
supposed to be protected against legislative infringement by the Cana-
dian Constitution. Given the kinds of objectives that Lamer considered 
to be sufficiently compelling and substantial for Aboriginal title to be 
infringed, one has to seriously question the value of this constitutional 
entrenchment. 
However, the Sparrow justification test does include a couple of 
features that may serve to provide practical protection to Aboriginal ti-
tle. First, the requirement that the fiduciary obligations of the Crown 
be respected includes a duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples when 
infringements of their Aboriginal rights are contemplated. In Delgamu-
ukw, Lamer put it this way: 
aboriginal title encompasses within it a right to choose to what 
ends a piece of land can be put ... This aspect of aboriginal title sug-
gests that the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and ab-
original peoples may be satisfied by the involvement of aboriginal 
peoples in decisions taken with respect to their lands. There is al-
ways a duty of consultation. 77 
The extent of this duty will depend on the circumstances, including the 
severity of the infringement. It could range from a minimum standard 
to discuss the matter where the infringement is relatively minor, up to 
a requirement of full consent where serious infringement is involved. 
I 
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Even where the minimum standard applies, however, "this consultation 
must be in good faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing 
the concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. 1178 
Secondly, the duty to respect the Crown's fiduciary obligations in-
cludes a duty to pay compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title. 
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer found that this duty arose out of 
the title's economic aspect. He elaborated as follows: 
Indeed, compensation for breaches of fiduciary duty are [sic] a 
well-established part of the 1andscape of aboriginal rights: Guerin, 
[supra n.22]. In keeping with the duty of honour and good faith on 
the Crown, fair compensation will ordinarily be required when ab-
original title is infringed. The amount of compensation payable 
will vary with the nature of the particular aboriginal title affected 
and with the nature and severity of the infringement and the ex-
tent to which aboriginal interests were accommodated.79 
Moreover, as this duty to pay compensation is part of the justifica-
tory test for infringements of Aboriginal title, the duty itse1f appears to 
be constitutional. This probably means that Parliament cannot avoid it 
by passing legislation, as it can where other, non-constitutional prop-
erty rights are concerned.80 So as a practical matter, this duty to pay 
compensation might well cause Parliament to exercise caution before 
infringing Aboriginal title, especially if the benefit of the infringement 
would go mostly to a province or a third party. 81 
4. Implications of Delgamuukw for the Protection 
of Other Property Rights in Canada 
For Canadians who are concerned about the protection of their private 
property rights from government interference, the Delgamuukw deci-
sion is anything but reassuring. It is sobering to compare the degree of 
protection that the Supreme Court accorded to the constitutional prop-
erty rights of the Aboriginal peoples with the protection the courts 
have traditionally accorded to common law property rights. To quote 
again from Blackstone, "[s]o great moreover is the regard of the law for 
private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, 
not even for the general good of the whole community. "82 Acknowledging par-
liamentary sovereignty, however, Blackstone had to concede that, for a 
new road to be constructed, for example, the legislature could and of-
ten did expropriate land for the public good upon payment of full com-
pensation. However, only the legislature can authorize this because the 
executive has no authority to expropriate property, even for public pur-
poses, without statutory authority. 83 Moreover, while in theory there 
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would be nothing to prevent a legislature from expropriating land for 
reasons other than public purposes such as roads and other infrastruc-
ture, or without paying compensation, in practice this rarely happens, 
as legislatures are reluctant to infringe a fundamental common law 
right without good reason.84 
In Canada various federal and provincial statutes govern the taking 
of private property for public purposes.85 The Canada Expropriation 
Act,86 for example, provides in section 4(1) that "[a]ny interest in land 
... that, in the opinion of the Minister [of Public Works and Govern-
ment Services], is required by the Crown for a public work or other 
public purpose may be expropriated by the Crown in accordance with 
the provisions of this Part. "87 However, as Professor Eric Todd has 
pointed out, "[t]he exercise of the power of expropriation interferes 
drastically with private property rights and therefore the courts gener-
ally construe expropriation statutes strictly and in favour of the individ-
ual whose rights are affected. 1188 Moreover, any exercise of a power of 
expropriation has to comply strictly with the procedural requirements 
in the enabling statute. Failure to respect those requirements will ren-
der the expropriation invalid, exposing the expropriating authority to 
damages and/or an injunction for trespass or nuisance. 89 
We have seen that, despite the constitutional entrenchment of Ab-
original title, the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw said that it can be in-
fringed to meet objectives that appear to go far beyond the kind of 
public purposes envisaged by expropriation statutes.90 As long as the 
infringement is of sufficient importance to the general public, and the 
Crown's fiduciary obligations are respected, the constitutional rights of 
the Aboriginal peoples can be legislatively overridden. Moreover, there 
is no mention in Delgamuukw of any requirement for the kinds of pro-
cedural safeguards that are generally contained in expropriation stat-
utes.91 So in practice, if not in constitutional theory, Aboriginal title 
might enjoy greater protection against federal infringement under cur-
rent expropriation legislation than it does under the Canadian Consti-
tution. If this is correct, we should be very skeptical of the value of 
constitutional entrenchment of any property rights. 
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